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POLICE OFFICER'S SAFETY;
AN EXCEPTION WITHIN AN EXCEPTION OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
by leffrey T Wennar, JD.
Much has been written regarding the
Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and its requirement that a search
warrant be issued by a neutral and detached
magistrate before a search and seizure can be
valid. Over the years, exceptions to this re-
quirement have evolved and been recognized
by the Supreme Court of the United States.'
1 California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 630 (1991) (the
recovery of the crack cocaine was not the fruit of an illegal
search because the defendant discarded it before being ar-
rested); (Maryland. v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990) (law
enforcement officials may conduct a limited search of clos-
ets or closed areas where a suspect was arrested to ensure
their safety from any possible threats); Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (warrantless searches and seizures
are not permissible if there were no exigent circumstances);
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) (holding that
individuals demonstrate a degree of privacy when they place a
lock on a container and law enforcement must obtain a warrant
to search its contents); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364, 369 (1976) (holding that law enforcement may inventory
the items found in automobiles after being impounded); Cady
v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 446-47 (1973) (police officers
will take certain precautions for the safety of the community);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (courts
must look at the totality of the circumstances to detennine
whether consent was given for law enforcement to search a
specific area); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
465 (1971) (stating that objects can be seized if they are in
'plain view' and as long as nothing in the surrounding area is
touched); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970) (de-
termining that a search of a car without a warrant is constitu-
tional so long as the officer has probable cause to believe that
there is contraband inside the car); Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (holding that during a search incident
to arrest a law enforcement officer can search the area imme-
diately within arm's reach of the detained individual); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (police officers may conduct a
limited frisk of an individual if he or she has reasonable sus-
Within those exceptions lies a body of law
examining and recognizing a concern to all -
law enforcement officers' safety.2 It does not
re-examine the Fourth Amendment, but in-
stead addresses those United States Supreme
Court cases establishing the law effecting law
enforcement safely.
The Supreme Court established the
obligation of inferior courts regarding Fourth
Amendment issues when the Court stated,
"[lIt] is the duty of courts to be watchful for
the constitutional rights of the citizen . . . ."3
"The right of privacy was deemed too pre-
cious to entrust to the discretion of those
whose job is the detection of crime and the
arrest of criminals."4 For the last half century,
courts have followed the mandate that, ". . .
the Fourth Amendment protects people ....
Without specifically recognizing an exception
for officer's safety, within specific recognized
picion that criminal activity is afoot, happened, or is about to
happen); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (law
enforcement officials can act without a warrant in the circum-
stance that their safety or the safety of innocent bystanders
may be endangered).
2 Firearms related fatalities were the second leading
cause of death among America's law enforcement officers in
2013. Handguns were the leading type of firearm used in fatal
shootings of law enforcement officers in 2013. Law Enforce-
ment Officers Memorial Fund, Law Enforcement Fatalities
Dip to Lowest Level in Six Decades, nleomf.org, available at
http://www.nleomf.org/assets/pdfs/reports/2013-EOY-Fatality-
Report.pdf.
3 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
4 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-456
(1948).
5 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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exceptions, the Supreme Court has addressed
the paramount importance of protecting the
men and women of law enforcement who daily
put themselves at risk when encountering the
public. Case law addresses officer safety in
the context of on street encounters,6 vehicle
stops,' and protective sweeps.'
The Fourth Amendment becomes ap-
plicable when an individual has been seized
and a reasonable person does not feel free to
leave.9
arrest.1 4 The purpose of the stop is detecting
evidence of the crime, past crime, stopping
crime then in progress, or preventing the pos-
sibility of imminent crime.'I Each is a distinct
intrusion, each is designed to serve a distinct
purpose, each requires a distinct justification,
and each is subject to distinct scope limita-
tions.16 A purpose of the frisk is not focused
upon the crime at all, but rather upon the
protection of the stopping officer."
A PURPOSE OF THE FRISK S NOT FOCUSED UPON THE CRIME AT ALL,
BUT RATHER UPON THE PROTECTION OF THE STOPPING OFFICER.
The assertion of officer's safety does
not establish an unfettered opportunity for
law enforcement officers to frisk, pat down or
searcho an individual they have encountered.
Reasonable articulable suspicion" is required
for law enforcement officers to stop individu-
als. "Reasonable suspicion means something
more than inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or hunch [but] less . . . than prob-
able cause."l2 However, while this standard
is sufficient to stop an individual, it does not
automatically give the officer a right to frisk
that individual.13
As the officer encounters the individu-
al, the officer's interaction with that individual
may become progressively more intrusive
based on the officer's successive observations
to a set of escalating responses: (i) articulable
suspicion that a crime has occurred, is occur-
ring, or is about to occur - this will justify the
stop; (2) articulable suspicion that the stopped
person may be armed - this will justify the
frisk; (3) an arrest; then, (4) search incident to
6 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27-28.
7 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
8 Buie, 494 U.S. at 334.
9 Michigan v. Chestnut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988).
10 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968).
11 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 53 (1979).
12 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-124 (2000).
13 Sibron, 392 U.S. at 74.
"In the case of the self-protective search for
weapons [the officer] must be able to point to
particular facts from which [the officer] rea-
sonably inferred that the individual was armed
and dangerous."" Once the officer has been
satisfied that there is suspicious behavior that
warrants investigation, ". . . it would appear to
be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the
power to take necessary measures to deter-
mine whether the person is in fact carrying a
weapon and to neutralize the threat of physi-
cal harm."' 9
The Court has been adamant, noting
in Terry, "[w]e need not develop at length in
this case, however, the limitations which the
Fourth Amendment places upon a protective
search and seizure for weapons. These limita-
tions will have to be developed in the concrete
factual circumstances of individual cases." 20
On the same day the Court issued its opinion
in Terry, the Court issued an opinion consoli-
dating two cases also addressing searches of
individuals who were stopped and searched by
14 Terry, 392 U.S. at 10.
15 Id. at 26.
16 Id. at 25-26.
17 Id. at 29, 31.
18 Sibron, 392 U.S. at 64 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 24).
19 Terry, 392 U.S. at 24.
20 Id. at 29.
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police officers.2 1 In dicta, the Court explained
that a search may be permitted, even when
probable cause for an arrest is lacking, if the
officer".. .had reasonable grounds to believe
[the suspect] was armed and dangerous." 22
"The search for weapons approved in Terry
consists solely of a limited patting of the outer
clothing of the suspect for concealed ob-
jects which might be used as instruments of
assault." 23 The case law is clear, . . . a search
incident to a lawful arrest may not precede the
arrest and serve as part of its justification."24
vehicle."2 8
A decade before Michigan c. Long, the
Court had the opportunity to review an offi-
cer's actions when the officer approached the
occupant of a vehicle, reached into the win-
dow, and removed a gun from the occupant's
waistband. 29 All of the actions taken by the of-
ficer were based upon information supplied by
a citizen. The Court refused to adopt a hold-
ing that a stop and frisk can only occur based
upon an officer's observation.3 0 In rational-
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFHCER MAY ORDER OCCUPANTS TO STEP OUT OF
A VEHICLE DURING A TRAFFIC STOP, AND MAY FRISK THOSE PERSONS
FOR A WEAPON WHEN THERE IS A REASONABLE BELIEF THAT THEY
ARE ARMED AND DANGEROUS
With the authority to arrest comes the author-
ity to search, incident to arrest, 25 in order to
seize any weapon that can be used against the
arresting officer.26
Terry was applicable to individuals only.
In Terry the encounter between the indi-
vidual and law enforcement occurred when
both were pedestrians on a public street and
involved only the protective search of the
individual for weapons. The question then
became, could protective searches extend
beyond the individual in the absence of prob-
able cause? The Supreme Court addressed
this question in Michigan c. Long.27 The Court
phrased its inquiry as, "...the authority of a
police officer to protect himself by conduct-
ing a Terry-type search of the passenger com-
partment of a motor vehicle during the law-
ful investigatory stop of the occupant of the
21 Sibron, 392 U.S. at 47.
22 Id. at 63.
23 Id. at 65.
24 Id. at 67.
25 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763-63.
26 Preston v. United States 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964).
27 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
izing its affirmation of the seizure, the Court
examined the holding in Terry. The Court
enunciated a principle from Terry that permits
the limited pat down for weapons where the
officer has justification in the belief the per-
son being investigated is armed and danger-
ous. The Court stated, "[the] purpose of this
limited search is not to discover evidence of
crime, but to allow the officer to pursue [the]
investigation without fear of violence . . ."31
The fact that this search occurred in an auto-
mobile rather than through a street encounter
was not addressed by the Court. The Court
recognized, based on the information pro-
vided to the officer, the officer". . . had ample
reason to fear for his safety."3 2
A law enforcement officer may order
occupants to step out of a vehicle during a
traffic stop, and may frisk those persons for
a weapon when there is a reasonable belief
that they are armed and dangerous.3 3 The
28 Id. at 1037.
29 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972).
30 Id. at 147.
31 Id. at 146.
32 Id. at 148.
33 See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977);
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Court stated, ". . . we recognize that investiga-
tive detentions involving suspects in vehicles
are especially fraught with danger to police
officers."3 4
... protection of police and others
can justify protective searches when
police have a reasonable belief that
the suspect poses a danger, that
roadside encounters between police
and suspects are especially hazard-
ous, and the danger may arise from
the possible presence of weapons in
the area surrounding a suspect. ...
the search of the passenger compart-
ment of an automobile, limited to
those areas in which a weapon may
be placed or hidden, is permissible
if the police officer COURTS ARE
possesses a reason- CUT R
able belief based on
'specific and articu- ANALYZE BOT
lable facts, taken
together with the NON-I EADLY F
rational inferences
from those facts,
reasonably warrant' TO THE REA
the officers in be-
lieving that the sus- STANDARD 0pect is armed and
dangerous and the AMEN
suspect may gain
immediate control
of weapons."
The Court, in a footnote to this holding,
stressed that their decision ". . . does not mean
that police may conduct automobile searches
whenever they conduct an investigative stop. "36
That footnote became the holding in Arizona
. Gant,37 where the Supreme Court held an
investigative stop does not authorize a vehicle
search incident to a recent occupant's arrest
after the arrestee has been removed from the
vehicle and secured, thus overruling New York
. Belton.38 However, Gant added an indepen-
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997).
34 Long, 463 U.S. at 1047.
35 Id. at 1049.
36 Id. at n.14.
37 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009).
38 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
0
S
F
0
dent exception for a warrantless search of a
vehicle's compartment "when it is reasonable
to believe that evidence relevant to the crime
of arrest might be found in the vehicle." 39 A
unanimous Supreme Court ruled that a traf-
fic stop is a seizure of both the driver and the
passenger, thus either individual "may chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the stop." 40
The street and roadside encounters
were the basis for the Court's eventual deci-
sion permitting police to conduct a protective
sweep of an in-home arrest, only when the
officer has a "reasonable belief based on spe-
cific and articulable facts that the area to be
swept harbors an individual posing a danger
to those on the arrest
scene." 41 The Supreme
Court previously ruled
that officers had ". . .
I DEADLY AN the limited authority to
detain the occupants
ROE PURSUANT of the premises while
a proper search is
ON A BLEN ES S conducted." 42 Justice
Holmes wrote, ". . . the
THE FOURTH character of every act
depends upon the cir-
M ENT cumstances in which itis done." 43An officer en-
countering an individ-
ual has a finite amount of time within which
to assess the situation. Unlike most individu-
als, a police officer has certain experiences
and specialized training to draw upon 44 when
making inferences and deductions regarding
said situations. The question in every situ-
ation is whether "the circumstances are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger." 45 "The reasonableness of the officer's
39 Gant, 556 U.S. at 335.
40 Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 259 (2007) (cit-
ing 6 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, §11.3(e) (4th ed. 2004
and Supp. 2007)).
41 Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 325 (1990).
42 Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981).
43 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (cit-
ing Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 205, 206 (1904)).
44 United States v. Aryizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002).
45 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
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decision to stop a suspect does not turn on
the availability of less intrusive investigating
techniques."46
In order to avoid suppression of any ev-
idence recovered during one of these encoun-
ters, the officer has to be able to articulate
what was being observed and how those ob-
servations were processed at the time the ob-
servations were made. That articulation must
address "the totality of the circumstances" 47
encountered by the officer and related to ex-
perience and training. Each situation encoun-
tered by an officer is somewhat different. The
officer must have a "particularized and objec-
tive basis' for suspecting legal wrongdoing. "48
"Reasonable suspicion depends on 'the factual
and practical con-
siderations of ev-
eryday life on which
reasonable and pru-
dent men, not legal
technicians, act."49
This "commonsense
approach"o is met
through the articu-
lation of reasonable
suspicion..
In two civil
use of force" cases,
the Supreme Court" recognized that, "police
officers are often forced to make split-second
judgments - in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain and rapidly evolving - about the
amount of force that is necessary in a par-
ticular situation."5 3 The court clearly limited
the use of deadly force to those situations ". .
. necessary to prevent escape and the officer
has probable cause to believe that the suspect
46 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989).
47 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).
48 Aryizu, 534 U.S. at 273.
49 Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1690
(2014).
50 Id.
51 42 U.S.C. §1983 (2014).
52 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
53 Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
poses a significant threat of death or serious
physical injury to the officer or others."54
"[An] officer [has] the right to use
deadly force if that officer harbored an ob-
jective and reasonable belief that a suspect
presented an immediate threat to his safety."55
Courts are directed to analyze both deadly and
non-deadly force pursuant to the reasonable-
ness standard of the Fourth Amendment.5 6
"The 'reasonableness' of a particular use of
force must be judged from the perspective of
a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than
with the 20/20 vision of hindsight."
The practitioner, either defense or pros-
ecution, faced with the issue of officer's safety
may find two recog-
nized exceptions to
the Fourth Amend-
ment requirement
persuasive. The first
recognized exception,
exigent circumstanc-
es58 applies when "the
exigencies of the situ-
ation make the needs
of law enforcement
so compelling that [a]
warrantless search is
objectively reason-
able. . . ."5 Those exigent circumstances are
not unqualified. The ". . . exigent circumstanc-
es rule justifies a warrantless search when the
conduct of the police preceding the exigency
is reasonable in the same sense."o Courts will
permit the warrantless search pursuant to this
exception where ". . . the police did not cre-
ate the exigency by engaging or threatening
to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth
Amendment . . . ."61 The second recognized
54 Garner, 471 U.S. at 3.
55 Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865 (2014) (inter-
nal quotes omitted).
56 Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
57 Id. at 396.
58 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978).
59 Id.
60 Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1858 (2011).
61 Id.
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exception is consent.6 2 When challenged, the
court must make a determination based upon
a "totality of the circumstances" whether the
consent was knowingly and voluntarily given.63
The prosecutor applying these two
analogous exceptions, must, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence persuade the court that
the officer acted appropriately given the situ-
ation the officer was confronted with at the
time of the incident. The prosecutor is well
advised to make certain that the officer can
objectively articulate all facts that the officer
was presented with which led to the use of
force for the officer's safety. Likewise, apply-
ing these two exceptions the defense must be
prepared to refute the officer's testimony. This
preparation should include, but is not limited
to: reviewing discovery, speaking to witnesses,
going to the scene, attempting to locate wit-
nesses not previously interviewed by police,
and otherwise conducting a thorough inde-
pendent investigation.
Courts have bestowed upon law en-
forcement officers the authority to use deadly
and non-deadly force when confronted with
an imminent threat. The officer will have to
justify this force when called upon to do so.
It stands to reason then that the same officer
has the implied authority to conduct a search
without the benefit of a search warrant when
the officer perceives and can articulate with
as much detail as possible why that action was
taken.
62 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227
(1973).
63 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557
(1980).
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